Реферат: Redesigning the Dragon Financial Reform in the Peoples Republic of China

Redesigning theDragon

Financial Reformin the Peoples Republic of China

Duncan Marsh dmarsh@indiana.edu

Anna Pawul apawul@indiana.edu

Dmitri Maslitchenko dmitri@mailroom.com

V550, Government Finance in theTransitional Economies

21 November, 1996

In 1978, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) embarked onthe enormous undertaking of opening its doors to the outside world. Until thispoint in time, the PRC had relied on acentralized economic system much like that of the former Soviet Union[1].However, the PRC’s situation differed with the former Soviet Union in threesubstantial ways[2]

1) although reforms followed theCultural Revolution (which did exact its toll on the Chinese economy) there wasan absence of severe macroeconomic crises when reforms were begun 2)agricultural infrastructure was good, although the incentives were poor and 3)China had a strong presence of overseas Chinese and Hong Kong that influenceits economic development and over the years supplied capital and humanresources.

The industrialization strategy adopted by the PRC has been characterized by gradualism andexperimentation. Its focus has been to introduce market forces, reducemandatory planning, decentralize, and open the economy to foreign investmentand trade[3]. This strategy had three main stages. Thefirst (1979-1983) established four “Special Economic Zones” (areas awardedspecial freedoms to conduct business relatively free of the authoritiesintervention) in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, the second (1984-1987) added14 port cities creating the “Economic Development Zones”, and finally the thirdstage (1988-present) which opened most of the country to foreign trade andcreated “tariff free zones”[4]

. In the rural areas, land reforms spearheadedfurther reforms and also the establishment of Township and Village Enterprises(TVEs). These enterprises were able tocapitalize on the abundant cheap labor in rural areas and to operate withoutthe burden of providing social spending. They also provided a training ground for the learning of market skillsand concepts. Today, production of manufactured goods by rural and townshipenterprise is estimated to account for more than 40% of the GDP.

In many respects, China’s process of economic reform hasbeen highly successful.

Sinceits inception, the average GDP growth has been a world-leading 9.3% year, thepoverty rate has declined 60%, and 170 million Chinese living in absolutepoverty have seen their standard of living raised above the minimum povertylevel. Export growth was 7.8% in 1993,29% in 1994 and 34.7% in 1995.[5] Government measures to control inflation,which had threatened to overheat the economy in the early 1990s, seem to havetaken effect: inflation was under 15% in 1995. (See Tables 1 and 2.)

Table 1.

Source:EIU Country Report, China/Mongolia, 3rd Quarter 1996.The Economist Intelligence Unit.

Table 2.

Source:EIU Country Report, China/Mongolia, 3rd Quarter 1996.The Economist Intelligence Unit.

Chineseeconomic reform has one other characteristic that sets it apart from that ofthe former Soviet Union, the absence of democratic reforms. The currenttransition is being carried out within the “socialist framework” and for the most part is centrally controlled.Much of the world waited to see whether the economic transition would derailafter the Tiananmen incident in 1989; it did not. However China did seem to belooking for a way of separating itself from reforms and democratic upheavalthat were happening in the former Soviet Union[6]. In 1992, Deng Xiao Ping toured the southerneconomic zones — a journey significant for its highly symbolic approval of thereform and investment efforts he witnessed — and coined the phrase “socialistmarket economy”. Deng emphasized that this transition must promote thedevelopment of productivity, strengthen the national power and improve people’sstandard of living, stating that, “..with all these achievements secure, oursocialist foundation is greatly strengthened..”[7]

Within this backdrop, we will take a closer look at thesystem of reforms currently underway in the People’s Republic of China. Thisyear marks the beginning of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1996-2000). Examining the individual parts (the budgetprocess, public expenditure, taxes, banking, the interaction between centraland provincial governments, and the emerging need to transform the socialsafety net) will present a clearer picture of what has been accomplished by themacroeconomic reforms put in place in 1976 as well as what still needs to bedone.

Revenue, Expenditure and the Budget

One problem of major proportion facing the Chinesegovernment is that central government revenues are growing at a much slowerrate than the overall economy, and a growing budget deficit has resulted (seeTable 3 in Appendix, page 20).[8] This is especially debilitating in the faceof increasing demands from the surging economy for investment in infrastructureand with the need for investment in a reformed social insurance system thatwill come with economic disruptions caused by continuing liberalization. Expenditures have also been falling as apercentage of GDP, but are growing faster than revenue.

Several factors have been identified in the shrinkingrevenue-to-expenditures ratio problem:

Revenue

·

Tax arrears on the industrial andcommercial tax (CICT) from enterprises, which are growing as state-ownedenterprises (SOEs) become more unprofitable in the face of increasingcompetition. At the end of 1994, thesearrears amounted to 8.2 billion yuan (¥), and just seven months later, thefigure had grown to ¥17.9 bn.[9]

·

Tax exemptions granted by localgovernments to state-owned and private enterprises.

Expenditures

·

Subsidies to the loss-making SOEs,in the form of loans or direct subsidies (see Table 4). China’s 1995 budget deficit was around a mere1.5% of GDP. If policy lending bycentrally controlled banks — most of which is, effectively, transfers to SOEswhich can never afford to pay back these loans — is taken into account, thecentral government’s true deficit is 6% of GDP or higher.[10]

·

Price subsidies. (Most of these were for urban food, andadjustments made in 1992 have reduced this drain on the budget.)

·

Higher than expected increases inexpenditures (in 1995, these were 18% higher than planned on the central level,with local government expenditures over 30% higher than in 1994.)[11]

·

A drop of 10.7% in customs revenuefrom 1994 to 1995.

·

Inflation-indexed interestsubsidies on bank deposits and treasury bonds, which have been kept high byhigh inflation rates.

Table 4.

Source: Wong, ChristineP.W., Christopher Heady, and Wing T. Woo. Fiscal Management and EconomicReform in the People’s Republic of China. Oxford University Press. HongKong: 1995.

For a country controlled by a Communist party, thegovernment’s proportion of economic activity has been remarkably small, evenbefore implementation of reform. In1995, official government spending was just 11.6% of GDP. Off-the-books revenue raising schemes bylocal governments may mean the state’s total revenue is two times the officiallevel.

The extra-budgetary revenue investment was dispersed,uncoordinated and did not fulfill the central government’s investmentpriorities. The central government facedgrowing infrastructure demands, but with shrinking (in proportionate terms)assets available, has been forced to reduce capital construction spendingsubstantially. Also, expenditures on administration, culture, education, andwelfare increased over the reform period, and reduced the government’s abilityto spend on infrastructure.[12] (See Table 5 in Appendix, page 22.) The increases in administration spending areparticularly troubling, because of government policies to reduce control of theeconomy and shrink some government bureaus.

One of the stated goals of the Ninth Five-Year Plan is toeliminate the budget deficit by year 2000. But this goal is highly unlikely to be achieved due to other conflictinggoals, like spurring employment, which may mean increasing subsidies tounprofitable SOEs; reducing regional income disparities; and strengtheningagriculture, which is seen as a key to controlling inflation.

Christine Wong, an expert on the Chinese financialsystem, identifies three necessary changes to restore the health of thebudget: First, the tax administrationmust be strengthened. Second, the taxstructure must be reformed so that it is neutral across products and sectors. Third, the revenue-sharing system betweenlocal, provincial and national levels of government must be revamped, withclearer tax assignments in line with each levels set of responsibilities. The central government’s control over the taxsystem and share of total revenues will likely have to be increased. The nexttwo sections will address these proposed changes.[13]

Taxation

ThePre-Reform Tax System

Prior to economic reforms, China’s tax structure wasbased on the Soviet model. Enterprises remitted their profit to the government,retaining only what was necessary to pay expenses. Revenues were collected bylocal governments, and a certain amount was filtered up to the centralgovernment. In 1984, this was replacedby a system of enterprise income taxation reform, in which companies were taxedon their profits, as the government tried to respond to economic imbalancescreated by the emerging private sector. The turnover tax (the ConsolidatedIndustrial and Commercial Tax, or CICT), which had been the largest contributorto the government’s annual revenue, was replaced with a business tax, a producttax, and a value-added tax (VAT). These featured highly differentiated taxrates across sectors, types of good and service, and form of firm ownership.Most private firms paid a base tax rate of 33%, while most state-ownedenterprises (SOEs) were nominally taxed at 55%.[14]In practice, however, taxes paid were governed by a contract responsibilitysystem (CRS), in which enterprises negotiated individually with localgovernment units. This system createdconflict of interest because often the local government was both tax collectorand enterprise owner. Not only werethere differentiated rates which distort economic activity, there was littleincentive for full tax remittance back to the central government under thissystem. (See Table 6 in Appendix, page23, for a description of the tax structure from 1985-1991.)

1994 Reforms

In 1994, the Chinese government began to respond to theseproblems by enacting a series of reforms. The CICT was abolished and the following taxes were created or modified:

Enterprise Income Tax. This unified corporation tax taxes companies at asingle 33% rate. Foreign enterprises andjoint ventures are still enjoying lighter tax burdens, because of the fiercecompetition between regions to attract foreign investment, but these privilegesare to be gradually eliminated.

Personal Income Tax. Operateson a sliding scale, with a maximum of 45%. Not yet comprehensively-implemented.

Value-Added Tax (VAT). Replaces the product tax of the CICT. Most goods taxed at 17%, but agricultural andfood products will be taxed at 13%, and small-scale businesses will pay flatrate of 6%.

Consumption (Excise). Focusesnarrowly on “luxury goods:” tobacco, alcohol, gasoline, and a few others.

Business tax for services.Serviceindustries will face a business tax of 3% to 20% on sales in place of theVAT. This tax also will apply totransfer of intangible assets and the sale of real estate.[15]

Capital Gains. Acapital gains tax was to be introduced in 1994, but its implementation waspostponed because of concern over its adverse impact on China’s fledgling stockmarkets.

1996Reforms

In 1996, China announced plans to reduce its importtariff rate from 35.9% to 23%, while abolishing preferences for certain goodsand, importantly, eliminating exemptions from import tariffs (currently, over80% of imports are exempt from import duties for various reasons).[16] This step alone should help to reduce therecent losses in customs revenue. The Ninth Five-Year Plan also includesprovisions to introduce taxes on interest earnings and inheritances, policiesdesigned to reduce income disparity.

Revisionof Tax Collection Structure

In order to make the above tax policy changes effective,the tax collection system must be revamped and greatly improved. The current structure is based on a system ofrevenue contracts between enterprise and government unit, and between local andcentral governments. One of the necessary reforms involves tax exemptions,which local governments often have the authority to grant to enterprises whofor one reason or another are unable to pay their taxes. This is a fundamental weakness in the Chinesefiscal system: local government has decision-making authority to grantexemptions on a tax the proceeds of which may in large part be assigned togovernments above. Numerous conflicts ofinterest can appear to reduce incentives to enforce the tax at the local level.[17]

To address these changes, China in 1994 initiated thesetting up of a centrally-managed National Tax Service. This would replace thecontract system with a national “tax system,” based on uniform rules of taxassignment and tax sharing. Certainassignments will be assigned to local governments, and others to centralgovernment; others will be shared according to predetermined formulas. Interestingly, in 1995, a special police unitwas set up to protect tax collectors under this new program.[18]

A potential obstacle to tax reform comes from localgovernments. Local governments havetraditionally supported reforms. Butthis is because the reforms have usually given them greater autonomy. The tax system reforms need to restore somecontrol over investment and spending back to the central government, whichcould encounter local opposition. Allowing local governments some discretion over local tax rates can givethem some of the autonomy they desire, and provide greater incentive forintergovernmental cooperation.

Few reports exist at present on the implementation ofthese reforms. Certainly, the spirit andscope of the reforms has been well-received by analysts, though more changesare advocated. But it will take several more years to determine the success ofthe reform of tax collection structures at the local level.

Intergovernmental Fiscal Relationships

A product of economic reforms in transitional economiesis often a shift in intergovernmental fiscal relationships. In the transitionfrom centralized economy to market economy it is often from a relationshipwhere the local or provincial government is the receiver of the “plan” to thelocal or provincial government proceeds with a greater autonomy. The evolutionof this relationship in the PRC has been very similar. However, the provincialor local governments were at an advantage over many other transitionaleconomies because the Chinese system had the following characteristics 1)localimplementation capacity was already established in the rural areas 2)China inmost areas has a high ethnic homogeneity and 3) there was much to gain byinter-province trading[19]

Thevery nature of Chinese economic reforms, gradual and incremental, allowed“scaffolding” of behavior. Partial reforms provided the environment to learnbehaviors that could then be applied to the next level of reform. Chineseeconomic reform was also structured on the idea of decentralization. Theestablishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) encouraged the local areas todevelop their own strategies to attract business and allowed them the freedom to implement thestrategies. The very earliest reforms, breaking up of farm communes, were alsocarried out at the local level.

Manyof the SEZs are doing very well and people living in these areas are enjoying ahigher standard of living than they had previously enjoyed. However, taxcollection still remains a difficult endeavor with compliance at only 70%. In order to improve the poorest areas inChina, policies and programs that are able to move this revenue to the poorerareas will be needed. This can take the form of a better accounting system toensure that all taxes due the central government for infrastructure developmentactually arrive there.

Banking Reforms, State Owned Enterprises and the SocialSafety Net

In order to put current economic reforms in perspective,understand the recommendations made by the international economic community,and fully address the quagmire of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), a more indepth look at the interconnectedness of the SOEs and the banking system must betaken. We will attempt to do just that using the context of bank development inthe PRC, monetary policy, and ongoing reforms to SOEs.

Reformof the banking system in the PRC has taken on similar characteristics to reformin other areas: i.e., gradual and experimental. At the beginning of reforms thefinancial sector in the PRC could hardly be called a financial sector[20].Financial sector development and implementation is a complex undertaking whichshould include the development ofinstitutions, instruments and markets[21]

.Currently in the PRC, banking reformlags behind other areas of reform[22].This is due to a complex array of policy decisions. No discussion of bankingreform in the PRC would be complete without an examination of the current stateof SOEs restructuring. Many macroeconomic initiatives are being put on hold inorder to bolster a failing state sector and postpone the social upheavals thatmay be associated with the needed reforms of this sector.

Background

TheCentral Bank was established in 1984. In1987 two additional universal banks were formed and non-bank financialinstitutions were started. In 1988 new capital markets were formed and thesecondary trade of government bonds was allowed. In 1990 the Shanghai andShenzhen stock exchanges were opened. In1992 all treasury bonds were issued through underwriters[23].At the end of 1994, the PRC had a total of 13 banks (of which 3 werespecialized banks and 3 were comprehensive banks). The new “financial system”contained 20 insurance companies, 391 trust and investment companies andgreater than 60,000 credit cooperatives that operate in local areas[24]

Duringthe summer of 1995 the central government announced a series of new banking laws would beestablished. These laws were the People’s Bank of China Law, the CommercialBanking Law, the Negotiable Instruments Law and the Guarantee Law. Up untilthis time the roles of each party in the framework of financial transaction hadn’t been clearly defined. These laws beginto lay the comprehensive groundwork for financial transactions[25].The People’s Bank of China Law which was established in the summer of 1995addresses the internal organization of the People’s Bank of China, its monetarypolicy, its supervision and tries toestablish its autonomy from provincialand local governments (it is still under the control of the State Council).This law has provisions in it for setting the prime lending rate, rediscountwindow, amount of funds to be lent to commercial banks, and the trade oftreasury bonds, government securities and foreign exchange. It also bars thePeople’s Bank of China from financingthe budget deficits of the central government and local governments. The Commercial Banking Law addresses the missionof commercial banks. These are still under the guidance of the State Counciland still must issue policy loans (although the law also states that any lossesdue to defaults on these loans will be compensated by the State Council).

TheNegotiable Instruments Law is similar to the United States’ Uniform CommercialCode. The Guarantee Law deals with mortgages, pledges, and liens. Both of theselaws are hoped to standardize and regulate credit transactions in the PRC[26].

MonetaryPolicy

Monetarypolicy in the PRC is currently administered through a central “credit plan”. This plan, which is administered by the StateCouncil, sets credit quotas for each bank and also facilitates direct bankfinancing of enterprises. In the current system the major objectives of thespecialized banks is to provide loans for various projects, agriculture andforeign trade. The main recipients ofthese loans are the state owned enterprises (SOEs). The terms and rates ofthese loans are very favorable (usually 12%[27]).Therefore the demand for these loans is higher than the supply and privatecompanies have to rely on other sources. This can take on various means and canoften lead to underground lending operations.

The convertibility of RMB has also been undergoing changes. Prior to January 1, 1994, therewere two money systems in China. One for local use, the other for foreigners. TheseForeign Exchange Certificates (FEC’s) were redeemable only in state operatedstores and restaurants. Only higher level officials were able to use these andmost imported goods required the use of FEC’s. Since doing away with FEC’s,RMB convertibility was relegated to official “swap shops”[28].Now, with the correct permit businesses can use any large bank to exchangemoney. However, the government has also begun to establish hard currency auditsas well as trying to force businesses to use the same bank for all of theirtransactions (a way of tracking how much money is being exchanged). The newconvertibility does meet IMF requirements[29]

.

StateOwned Enterprises and the Social Safety Net

As illustrated above, the banking system and state ownedenterprises are closely linked (see Table 7 in Appendix, page 24, for financingof SOEs). According to Chinese government statistics, up to 20% of the debt ofstate banks is bad debt. International estimates place this figure at almostdouble that amount[30].Recently in Jiangsu province, 30 SOEs declared bankruptcy telling the banks they were not going to pay theirdebts. If all the banks in China did this it would lead to bankruptcy of thebanks[31]

.SOEs account for only 34% of industrial output but consume 73.5% of governmentinvestment[32].Most have an average debt equal to 75% of total assets[33]. According to an Oxford Analytica study, inthe first eight months of 1995, SOE industrial output expanded by only 8.3%compared with a 13.7% increase for all industry. And according to estimates, non-SOEs, onaverage, required less than a third as much investment to achieve equivalentindustrial output.[34]

These are serious problems. The ninth five year economicplan (1996-2000) places priority on their eradication, calling for SOEs to layoff workers to boost efficiency, and encouraging SOEs to “declare bankruptcy iftheir liabilities outstrip assets, if they make long-term losses and if theylose out in market competition.”[35]Up until now current reforms and lessening of government controls have not onlynot reigned in this problem but have also created new ones such as assetstripping of the SOE by management, workers and local governments[36]

However, the central and local governments are stillhesitant to shut down even the most inefficient SOE. Currently, 7 out of 10industrial workers work in a SOE. The SOE provides not only a job but housing,education, pensions, insurance and often energy sources and commodity shops onsite. The World Bank estimates that only 56% of total expenditure by SOEs isactually on wages, the rest is on “social spending”[37]. Therefore, any reform involving the SOEsmust also involve reform and development of a social safety net. Pilot programshave been started where localgovernments create pension pools and are putting aside payroll taxes foreducation, health and unemployment benefits. It is also important to note thatthe question of “social security” reform is being worsened by additionalfactors. Population in the PRC is progressively growing older. This phenomenoncan be attributed to increase in life expectancy due to better livingconditions and the one child per family policy.

HowShould Reforms be Implemented?

Due to the interconnectedness of these areas of society,many of these reforms need to be implemented simultaneously. In May of thisyear the World Bank published a Country Study[38]that attempts to address these issues. The following are proposed reforms fromthis study.

1)

Reducethe role of government in the directing of resources.

This over time would lesson the State Councils role indirecting the day to day functions of the banks and eventually do away with thecredit plan. Banks would be able to allocate resources appropriately and to settheir own interest rates.

2)

Improvethe Central Bank’s management of monetary aggregates.

This over time would improve the consistency of bankinglaws by ensuring that they are used and would also remove policy lending fromthe banks and put it into the budget where it should be. This would also allowfor the development of the Central Bank as an institution.

3)

Transformstate commercial banks into real commercial banks.

This step would help to free the banks from the currentcrises of bad debt and allow them to loan money to the newly emerging privatesector.

4)Improve governance, diversify ownership and lower subsidies for SOEs.

In the short term this would include implementing anaccounting system and independent audits, give autonomy to the managers,getting rid of unviable businesses andrestructuring those SOEs that can be.

5)

Transfersocial services to the government.

This would reduce the burden on newly restructuredenterprises. Over time this would allow for a national system to beimplemented.

Conclusions

In comparison with other countries undergoing transitionfrom centrally-planned economic systems, China had the luxury of initiating itsreforms at a time when it faced no macroeconomic or serious politicalcrisis. It was able to adopt a two-trackapproach to economic reform: China continued state control of existingenterprises while loosening economic controls enough to permit growth of a new,nonstate sector. This was possible inpart because the inefficient state sector was a small share of the economy,compared to most socialist nations.

China’s reform experience thus far has been one of“enabling” reform, allowing “marketization” instead of forcing “privatization,”getting government to “step out of the way” of the flows of commerce. The results have been good to excellent in theproductive sectors, but the reform has not yet succeeded in the fiscal andmonetary sectors, which are the domains of government. Here the government can’t step out of theway; it must build the proper tools and structures to manage these sectors.[39] It is in these areas, and in the efforts toreduce administration, dismantle SOEs, and provide an adequate social insurancesystem for displaced workers and affected citizens that China faces its truereform challenges.

To further evaluate how far China has come down the pathof economic transition, we look to a definition of transition used by the WorldBank, which describes these three components:

·

Liberalization: freeing prices, trade and entry to marketsfrom state controls, while stabilizing the economy. Stabilization is an essential component toliberalization.

·

Clarifying property rights andprivatizing them where necessary. Requires re-creating the institutions that support market exchange andshape ownership, and especially the rule of law.

·

Reshaping social services and thesocial safety net to ease the pain of transition while propelling the reformprocess forward.

Examination of the Chinese experience shows thatliberalization has taken place to some degree, though much reform of prices,trade and markets is still to be done. However, privatization and the assignment of property rights are stillvery undeveloped, and the most difficult parts of transition ahead aredependent on a still-unachieved transfer of the social safety net fromenterprise-based to government control.[40]

Were China to continue to grow at the rates of the lasttwo decades, it would surpass the United States as the world’s largest economyin less than twenty years. Though sometapering off in the growth rate is expected, China, with its sheer size anddynamism, is emerging as one of the world’s economic powers. The reform policy choices it makes duringthis period of transition thus have not only domestic but internationalsignificance, as China’s domestic economic and social stability will be feltinternationally. The rest of the world has ample reason for assisting China inseeing these reforms through peacefully. Opening of economic activity withinChina and with the rest of the world will assist the process of political liberalizationwithin the country, and will provide enhanced regional and globalsecurity.

Table 3. The Fiscal Situation in the Reform Period

Source: Wong, ChristineP.W., Christopher Heady, and Wing T. Woo. Fiscal Management and EconomicReform in the People’s Republic of China. Oxford University Press. HongKong: 1995, p.24.

Table 5. GovernmentBudgetary Expenditures

Source: Wong, Christine P.W., Christopher Heady, and Wing T. Woo. Fiscal Managementand Economic Reform in the People’s Republic of China. Oxford UniversityPress. Hong Kong: 1995, p.24.

Table 6. Composition of Tax Revenues

Source: Wong, ChristineP.W., Christopher Heady, and Wing T. Woo. Fiscal Management and EconomicReform in the People’s Republic of China. Oxford University Press. HongKong: 1995, p.24.

Table 7. Changing Role of the State

Source:Harrold, Peter. China’sReform Experience to Date. WorldBank Discussion Papers #180. The World Bank:Washington, DC. 1992.

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[1]

Spence, Jonathan The Search for Modern China. London: W.W.Norton and Co., 1990.

[2]

Harrold, Peter “China’s Reform Experience to Date”, World BankDiscussion Paper #180, 1992.

[3]

Broadman, Harry “Meeting the Challenge of the Chinese EnterpriseReform”, World Bank Discussion Paper #283, 1995.

[4]

Lele and Ofori-Yeboah, Unraveling the Asian Miracle.Brookfield: Dartmouth Press, 1996.

[5]

World Bank Web Page, November 1996(http://www.worldbank.org/html/extdr/offrep/eap/china.htm)

[6]

Lele and Ofori-Yeboah Unravelingthe Asian Miracle. Brookfield: Dartmouth Press, 1996.

[7]

Gao, Shangquan China’s Economic Reform. Macmillan Press Ltd:London, 1996.

8 Wong, Christine P.W., ChristopherHeady, and Wing T. Woo. Fiscal Management and Economic Reform in thePeople’s Republic of China. Oxford UniversityPress. Hong Kong: 1995.

[9]

“China Budget Hurt By Tax Arrears.” Reuters Financial Service, 14August 95.

[10]

“Reform of China’s State-Owned Enterprises: A Progress Report ofOxford Analytica.” World Bank Web Page, November 16, 1996 (http://www.worldbank.org/html/prddr/trans/dec95/china.htm).

[11]

Ibid.

[12]

Hodder, Rupert. The Creation of Wealth in China: Domestic Trade andMaterial Progress in a Communist State. Belhaven Press. London: 1993, p. 80.

[13]

Wong, Christine. “China’sEconomy: The Limits of Gradualist Reform.” in China Briefing, 1994, ed.by William A. Joseph. WestviewPress. Boulder, CO: 1994

[14]

Stevenson-Yang, Anne. “NewReforms and Taxes for ‘94,” in The ChinaBusiness Review. U.S.-China Business Council. Washington, D.C.:January-February 1994.

[15]

Peck, Joyce, Peter Kung, and Khoon-Ming Ho. “Enter the VAT,” in The China Business Review. U.S.-China Business Council. Washington,D.C.: March-April 1994.

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